Mindblown: a blog about philosophy.

In reply to Irfan Khawaja. Sure, I can do that. As we’ll see, the book’s aims really come to focus in the Appendix (the “Grudge Informer” case), which Fuller and I both recommend reading before chapter 2. (The good stuff starts…

In reply to mlyoung57. “it is not just that I have most reason (of a distinctively moral kind, however one defines that) to not needlessly inflict pain on you, but that I’m required (morally required) not to do this.” You’re repeating…

In reply to Roderick T. Long. There are things that I have reason to do, even most reason to do, and then — distinctly — there are things that I must do. If I must take this left turn, that is different from this merely being the most advis…

In reply to Roderick T. Long. Well, I’m curious to see what happens next, then. Incidentally, as far as our discussions themselves, I was thinking of having you start the sessions on Fuller by saying a few words on why you chose this book, and wh…

In reply to Irfan Khawaja. the distinction strikes me as involving a false dichotomy. Agreed. I don’t know how much of the rest of the book turns on this. Very little, as far as I can see. LikeLike

In reply to mlyoung57. The distinction between moral-requirement type normative pressure and other types of moral normative pressure (whether one takes a broader or more narrow view of morality) seems obviously correct. We can express this perfectly we…

In reply to mlyoung57. “The distinction between moral-requirement type normative pressure and other types of moral normative pressure (whether one takes a broader or more narrow view of morality) seems obviously correct.” Inasmuch as I don&…

I’ve read about 1/2 of the first chapter and just took a break to read your post, Irfan (and your notes/comments, Roderick). The distinction between moral-requirement type normative pressure and other types of moral normative pressure (whether on…