Mindblown: a blog about philosophy.

In reply to Irfan Khawaja. Is it possible that Fuller is here using ‘requires’ in ‘what excellence requires of us’ in the non-normative sense (as when one speaks of what is required for something to count as having feature F)? O…

In reply to Irfan Khawaja. (A) I’m not sure what is meant by requirements that are not obligations. And I don’t know where Fuller makes the claim that the morality of aspiration (or the aspirational aspect of morality) includes requirements, but not ob…

In reply to Irfan Khawaja. Yeah. I mean, sure, some moral requirements are a bigger deal than others, but that seems to me a difference in degree, not kind. LikeLike

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In reply to mlyoung57. Re (1): I take it that a morality of aspiration is a morality with non-requirement-type normativity (say normativity that is a function of intrinsically desirable moral ends and means to these ends) but no normative requirement….

In reply to Roderick T. Long. Roderick: I don’t see how to create daylight between the virtuous person’s having most reason to do X and the virtuous person’s being morally required to do X. I don’t either, but Fuller’s problem is worse than…

In reply to Roderick T. Long. Yes, I’m just repeating the same thing. The hope, though, is that putting the point in terms of very simple, commonly-used terms (rather than in terms of my semi-technical, semi-idiosyncratic mumbo-jumbo) will add so…

In reply to Irfan Khawaja. Regarding your [1]. It might be that one must have a certain aspiration. That is correct. But I think your point here misses the mark. I take it that a morality of aspiration is a morality with non-requirement-type normativit…