Mindblown: a blog about philosophy.

In reply to boydstun. Yes, it’s a slippery thing to define “intrinsic property”. What I mean is that it does not consist in relations to anything else. The “consist in” is important. It is not that some instance of the pro…

[…] of a conference by the Association of Core Texts and Courses (ACTC). I’ve previously posted a version of it on the blog as well (haven’t compared them to see how they line up). To save time and money, ACTC seems […] LikeLike

I just learned that a paper of mine was published a few months ago in an online-only format, “The Fourth Amendment as a Core Text: A Pedagogy for the Citizen-Philosopher,” in Liberal Arts Education and the World, ed. Patrick Flynn, Alfred Martin, and Anthony Wisniewski. I submitted it back in 2012 or 2013 (!), so…

In reply to Irfan Khawaja. That said, this can’t be right: One thing I would have thought is very hard to dispute is that Kant says that categories such as causation and the forms of intuition, space and time, are inapplicable to the noumenal wo…

[…] придерживался левых убеждений, фокус на теории элит и либертарианском классовом анализе занимал центральное место. Благодаря влиянию Новых […] …

In reply to David Potts. Point taken. I guess I’d say that view becomes more Kantian if one accepts Blackburn’s view that intrinsic properties are the categorical grounds of causal properties (which I think I was unreflectively taking for g…

There seem to be quite a few different senses of ‘intrinsic’ in use by various users in different contexts. I don’t think I’m getting what is the one you are using and crafting and whether it is indeed only one. How can a phenomenal quality…

In reply to Irfan Khawaja. Surely this is an idiosyncratic reading of Kant? One thing I would have thought is very hard to dispute is that Kant says that categories such as causation and the forms of intuition, space and time, are inapplicable to the n…