Mindblown: a blog about philosophy.
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( Comments for Policy of Truth ) Comment on Germany, Ukraine, and Habermas: An American Perspective by mlyoung57
In reply to Irfan Khawaja. Very quick replies (nothing like an organized, systematic response). Numbers correspond to your numbering, Irfan. (1a) Why does there need to be a threat to us? If I see someone beating up an innocent stranger, my reason to i…
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( Comments for Policy of Truth ) Comment on Germany, Ukraine, and Habermas: An American Perspective by mlyoung57
In reply to Irfan Khawaja. Thanks. I’ll take a look. Meanwhile, some responses to what you wrote above, above. LikeLike
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( Comments for Policy of Truth ) Comment on Germany, Ukraine, and Habermas: An American Perspective by Irfan Khawaja
In reply to mlyoung57. “…what the most plausible counterpoints are…” https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/183040 LikeLike
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( Comments for Policy of Truth ) Comment on Germany, Ukraine, and Habermas: An American Perspective by mlyoung57
Welcome, John! I’m sympathetic to most of what you say here. To keep myself honest, I need to think about what the most plausible counterpoints are (or perhaps someone here can provide them [oh, there is Irfan — ed.]). Here is something tha…
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( Comments for Policy of Truth ) Comment on Germany, Ukraine, and Habermas: An American Perspective by Irfan Khawaja
John, As I mentioned to you earlier, I’m an outlier on my own blog on the subject of Ukraine. I may be the only person on this blog utterly opposed to involvement in Ukraine (or else the only one who’s vocalized that opposition). So this is…
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( Comments for Policy of Truth ) Comment on A FUNDAMENTAL RESPECT IN WHICH SCANLON SEEMS TO BE WRONG ABOUT MORAL WRONGNESS (AND WHAT THE CORRECT APPROACH MIGHT BE) by Roderick T. Long
Seems as much Smithian as Millian. LikeLike
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( Comments for Policy of Truth ) Comment on Scanlon and “Justifiability to Others” by Irfan Khawaja
(Responding to DP): I agree with all of that (meaning the original post), find it very well put, in fact. One passing comment on the very last paragraph, however: Formalistic (Kantian) approaches to moral theory in general seem to have a problem suppl…
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(Policy of Truth) A FUNDAMENTAL RESPECT IN WHICH SCANLON SEEMS TO BE WRONG ABOUT MORAL WRONGNESS (AND WHAT THE CORRECT APPROACH MIGHT BE)
I think Scanlon’s main thing, his account of moral wrongness, asserts an implausible explanatory relationship. Arguably, it says something like this: morally wrong actions are those actions that would be disallowed according to a principle of public, collective disallowing (“discouraging”) that, if followed, would not result in anyone being wronged (mistreated, abused, etc.). This is…
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( Comments for Policy of Truth ) Comment on Scanlon and “Justifiability to Others” by mlyoung57
If I have reason to act only in such a way that is justifiable to others (or such that it would not be appropriate or reasonable for anyone to object), it seems likely that this would be identical to, not part of a constitutive explanation of, my being…
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( Comments for Policy of Truth ) Comment on THOUGHTS ON THE BUCK-PASSING THEORY OF VALUE (HARD/SPECIAL CASES) by Scanlon and “Justifiability to Others” | Policy of Truth
[…] Second, justifiability to others is an ideal standard; it is not a question of getting others to actually accept something (154–155). The reason, Scanlon says, is that “there are obviously cases in which acting morally requires one to resist …
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